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IDENTIFYING FUNDAMENTAL BREACH OF
ARTICLES 25 AND 49 OF THE CISG: THE GOOD
FAITH DUTY OF COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS
TO CURE DEFECTS—MAKE THE PARTIES
DRAW A LINE IN THE SAND OF
SUBSTANTIALITY
Yasutoshi Ishida*

I. Introduction
Article 49(1) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (the “CISG”) allows the parties to international
1
sales of goods to avoid their contracts. In particular, it provides that “[t]he
buyer may declare the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to
perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention
2
amounts to a fundamental breach of contract.” The “fundamental breach”
in this provision is defined by article 25, which provides,
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is
fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as
substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under
the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a
reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances
3
would not have foreseen such a result.
This article addresses two daunting problems with this provision. The
first problem lies in the “unless” clause of the latter part of the provision.
The clause, which lays down a criterion referred to as the “foreseeability

*
Professor of Law, Himeji-Dokkyo University, Japan. LLM, Kyoto University
(1989). The author is profoundly indebted to late Professor Shinichiro Michida, Rapporteur of
the CISG at the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna in 1980, Adjunct Professor at University of
Michigan Law School, 1966. I also thank the editors of the Michigan Journal of International
Law for their valuable help and comments. I especially owe much to Ms. Lindsay Bernsen
Wardlaw, Editor-in-Chief. Her insightful suggestions greatly enhanced this article by making
it logically consistent in every aspect and by refining my English.
1.
UN Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods, art. 49(1), Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG]. Applicability of the Convention is determined by article
1, which provides: “(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties
whose places of business are in different States: (a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State.”
2.
Id. (emphasis added).
3.
Id. art. 25 (emphasis added).
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test” in this article, downgrades a fundamental breach to a non-fundamental
one if the breaching party did not foresee, and if a reasonable person would
4
not have foreseen, the substantial detriment. As we will see in Part II, the
role of the foreseeability test is very limited, partly because the phrase
“what he is entitled to expect” in the former part of article 25 can perform a
function comparable to the foreseeability test, and partly because it is
questionable whether there is ever a real case in which a reasonable person
could not foresee any results of a breach so devastating that they would
substantially frustrate the buyer’s expectations.
In addition to its limited applicability, the foreseeability test has an
intrinsic irrationality in linking unforeseeability to non-avoidance of
contract. That is, under the foreseeability test, the aggrieved party cannot
avoid the contract and must pay for the goods even if the goods are
irreparably defective, so long as that result was unforeseeable to the
breaching party. In sum, the foreseeability test is actually based on the
notion of culpability––or the lack of it––on the part of the breaching party.
This, however, is irrational: At the time of concluding the contract,
reasonable merchants would tacitly assume that the contract should be
avoided in such a situation. For these reasons, the foreseeability test both
can and should be nullified: The nullification is no big deal for the CISG
jurisprudence because the applicability of the test is very limited.
The second daunting problem in article 25 is how “substantially
deprived” the buyer must be of “what he is entitled to expect under the
contract” for the seller’s breach to become fundamental. As one
commentary aptly points out, “[d]efining fundamental by substantial . . .
5
leaves an impression of playful tautology.” For example, it is probably
clear that a seller delivering junk parts to a buyer, instead of the machine the
buyer has contracted for, has substantially deprived the buyer of what he is
entitled to expect under the contract, giving rise to a fundamental breach.
However, matters are not always that simple. We do not have an appropriate
criterion as to the level or magnitude required for substantial deprivation of
6
the legitimate expectations of the buyer. Whether a breach results in
substantial detriment depends on each party’s expectations, along with
numerous factors such as the kind and amount of the goods, purpose of the
7
contract, and other circumstances peculiar to the transaction in question. It

4.
In this article, the phrase “substantial detriment” is used as a short form for article
25’s language, “such detriment . . . as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to
expect under the contract.”
5.
Michael Will, Article 25, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 205, 212 (Cesare Massimo Bianca et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter VIENNA COMMENTARY] (emphasis added).
6.
In this article, the article 25 language “what he is entitled to expect under the
contract” is referred to as a party’s “legitimate expectations.”
7.
See BRUNO ZELLER, DAMAGES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INT’L SALE OF GOODS, ¶13.29 (3d ed. 2018) (“The word ‘detriment’ cannot be uniformly
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also turns on many aleatory factors, such as the gravity of the defects,
8
curability of defects, time and cost needed for cure, and the willingness of
parties to cure. It seems next to impossible to formulate a criterion which
embraces all of these elements and combines them.
By applying article 7(1)’s good faith requirement to other provisions of
the CISG relating to remedy, this article attempts to provide parties and
judges with an alternative solution for determining the existence of a
fundamental breach. Essentially, this article argues, a fundamental breach
occurs when the parties’ own attempts to cure have fallen short of the
parties’ obligations of good faith. This test both requires, and emphasizes
the importance of, nullifying the foreseeability test: While parties can
control and foresee their good faith efforts to cure, failed attempts to cure
are often unforeseeable. It is unfair that the foreseeability test prevents the
contract from being avoided in these situations, leaving fatally irreparable
goods in the hands of the buyer, who is not relieved of his obligation to pay.
In summary, this article answers the question of how to determine the
existence of a fundamental breach under article 25 that will enable
avoidance under article 49. It does so in two broad stages: First, it explains
that the second half of article 25 (the “foreseeability test”) should receive
lessened attention in this inquiry or should be rejected entirely. Second, it
returns to the first half of article 25, which contains the article’s affirmative
elements, homing in on the element of substantial deprivation. The word
“substantial” is subjective, and courts have struggled with its definition.
This article therefore proposes to define the substantiality of a detriment
through the existence of the parties’ good faith efforts to remedy the
detriment.
Part II critically examines the role of the “foreseeability test” and finds
that it is not a necessary component of article 25’s definition of a
fundamental breach. In Section A, this article concludes that the
“foreseeability test” exists as a proxy for the breaching party’s culpability. It
also points out the intrinsic irrationality of the foreseeability test, which
links unforeseeability to non-avoidance. Section B demonstrates that a
different article 25 phrase, “what he is entitled to expect,” can
independently perform a comparable function by screening out avoidances
premised on the injured party’s illegitimate expectations. Section C argues
that, in any event, there are not many cases in which a reasonable merchant
could not foresee that his action would constitute the kind of deprivation
that would substantially frustrate the buyer’s expectations.
Part III explores when the seller must foresee substantial detriment
under the foreseeability test. In Section A, two opposing views are
defined, as it depends on each party’s expectations of his entitlement under the contract. . . . It
takes on substance within a particular context only, that is, within a contract.”).
8.
In this article, the words “cure” and “remedy” mean to remove or ameliorate the
defects or other non-conformities of goods by such measures as repair and substitution. They
are also used as nouns of comparable meaning.
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examined: one fixing the time of foreseeability at the time of conclusion of
contract, and the other shifting the time of foreseeability to a later event.
Section B concludes that reasonable merchants will have a shared tacit
assumption at the time of concluding the contract that their contract should
be avoided if a breach unforeseeably causes substantial detriment.
Part IV, by analyzing court decisions, shows that we lack any other
appropriate criterion to identify a fundamental breach. It also shows that
substantial detriment can be measured by availability of remedy.
Part V continues to evaluate substantial detriment through the lens of
remedy, considering the case of easily obtainable, resalable, or repairable
goods and the case of irreparably defective goods. In the former case, due to
ease of remedy, a fundamental breach is relatively easily denied, and in the
latter, due to the difficulty—or impossibility—of remedy it is relatively
easily found.
In Part VI, focusing on cases which do not fall in either category
discussed in Part V, the article argues that the good faith principle provided
in CISG article 7(1) obliges the seller to offer to cure the goods’ defects,
and, conversely, it obliges the buyer to require the seller to do the same.
Section A criticizes the view that a curable defect of the goods does not in
itself amount to a fundamental breach, if there is the possibility that the
seller may cure. Section B examines the buyer’s right to require the seller to
repair. Notably, article 46(3) provides that the buyer may require the seller
to remedy the lack of conformity by repair but does not explicitly oblige the
buyer to do so. Nevertheless, Section C advocates that the buyer is obliged
to require the seller to repair defects by the application of article 7(1)’s good
faith requirement. Section D argues that the good faith principle also obliges
the buyer to require the seller to substitute the defective goods. Finally,
Section E examines the seller’s right to remedy his failure, provided in
article 48(1), and shows that the good faith requirement obliges the seller to
offer remedy. In the course of this reasoning, this paper settles the paradox
of the article 48(1)’s cross-reference to article 49 (“Subject to Article 49”),
one of the most controversial in international sales law.
Part VII synthesizes this analysis. It advocates that the seller and the
buyer must, in collaboration, make bona fide efforts to cure any defects, and
that the outcome of those attempts will decide whether the breach involved
amounts to a fundamental breach, dispensing with the need for an abstract
tautological criterion, like the foreseeability test.

II. The Questionable Role of the Foreseeability Test
As introduced above, article 25 of the CISG defines a “fundamental
breach”—one that allows a buyer to avoid a contract under article 49(1) —
as a breach that
results in such detriment to the other party as substantially to
deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract,
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unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person
of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have
9
foreseen such a result.
Critically, this provision releases the seller from the disadvantages resulting
from the buyer’s avoidance on two conditions: (1) The seller himself did not
foresee the substantial detriment, and (2) a reasonable person of the same
kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen the substantial
detriment. This author collectively refers to these criteria, found in the
“unless” clause, as the “foreseeability test.”
In this part, the article demonstrates that the role of the foreseeability
test
is very limited, partly because the “legitimate expectations”
requirement is an independent qualifier on fundamental breach (separate
from the foreseeability test, which functions as an escape hatch for sellers
when substantial detriment and legitimate expectations are present), and it
screens out those expectations of the aggrieved party which are
unforeseeable for the breaching party. And partly because a reasonable
person would usually foresee the substantial deprivation of a legitimate
expectation.
These propositions nullify the foreseeability test, advocating its intrinsic
irrationality. They also support the premise that this nullification will not
have a significant implication for the CISG jurisprudence because cases that
deny avoidance for the reason of unforeseeability are very rare. As later
parts will discuss, the better reading of article 25 is that the outcome of bona
fide efforts to attempt to cure should decide the fundamentality of the
breach. Yet, if we attempt to add a good faith attempt to remedy to our
article 25 analysis without nullifying the foreseeability test, we hit a
paradox: Failures to cure are often unforeseeable, but being unforeseeable
prevents the contract from being avoided! This result is irrational, leaving
the fatally defective goods in the hands of the buyer, who must pay for
them.

A. The Notion of Culpability in the Foreseeability Test
Why do we care about foreseeability? One possible interpretation of the
foreseeability test is that it describes the extent to which society is willing to
assign culpability (blameworthiness) to the breaching party. That is to say,
the breaching party is not liable or culpable (and hence the breach is not
egregious or “fundamental”) where the breaching party “did not foresee”
substantial detriment to the other party. Put in the terminology of criminal
law, the breaching party did not have mens rea in bringing about such
serious results from his breach. If asked, he would say, “Little did I dream
of my breach causing such a ruinous situation.” In such a situation, article

9.

CISG, supra note 1, art. 25 (emphasis added).
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25 exonerates the breaching party from culpability, and, accordingly, from
the hardship he would suffer if the injured party avoided the contract.
In contrast, the breaching party is culpable—and hence the breach is
fundamental—if the breaching party foresaw the injured party’s substantial
detriment because in that case the breaching party did have mens rea. The
breaching party, if explaining the situation candidly, would say, “I knew
well my breach would produce such a ruinous situation, and I dared do it.”
The drafting history of article 25 buttresses its interpretation as an
article determined by culpability. In 1976, the seventh session of the
Working Group of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (“UNCITRAL”) made the following draft of the article: “A breach
committed by one of the parties to the contract is fundamental if it results in
substantial detriment to the other party and the party in breach foresaw or
10
had reason to foresee such a result.” Read carefully, this language put the
burden of proof on the claimant (the aggrieved party) to show that the
breaching party foresaw or had reason to foresee the resulting detriment,
rather than on the breaching party to show that it did not foresee the same.
In UNCITRAL’s 1977 Session, a delegate of the Philippines, criticizing the
draft, stated:
Under the provisions of the article as it stood, it would be necessary
for the party in breach to foresee the result before a breach
committed became a “fundamental breach.” That was something
that would be extremely difficult to prove in court and it seemed
most unfair that the guilty party should be able to throw the burden
11
of proof on to the aggrieved party.
Following this criticism, article 25 was given its “unless” clause to
move the burden of proving (un)foreseeability to the “guilty” party—
12
namely, the party who has committed a fundamental breach. It was thereby
settled that the breaching party is not responsible for the unforeseeable
13
consequences of his breach.
The underlying problem with this approach is the irrational fiat of the
“unless” clause which links unforeseeability with unavoidability, based on
10.
See Shinichiro Michida, Cancellation of Contracts, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 279, 282
(1979); see also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [“UNCITRAL”], Yearbook Volume VII:
1976, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976, at 90, art. 8 (1977).
11.
See Michida, supra note 10, at 285 (emphasis added); see also UNCITRAL,
Yearbook Volume VIII: 1977, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977, art. 9 (1978).
12.
See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 25, in PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & INGEBORG
SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) 416, 419, ¶ 5 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER] (“It was only logical that, following a proposal by the
Philippines, an attempt was made to clarify the exceptional nature of that exoneration by
including the wording ‘unless . . .’: Material loss which the promisor did not foresee and could
not have foreseen should not be his responsibility.”).
13.
Id.
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14

the notion of culpability. Even when comparing otherwise identical
substantial detriments arising from a serious breach, the breaching party is
not culpable, and hence the breach is not fundamental, if the breaching party
did not foresee, or a reasonable person would not have foreseen, such a
result. If he foresaw or a reasonable person would have foreseen such a
result, the same breach is upgraded to a fundamental one. But that does not
make sense: Something that “results in such detriment to the other party as
15
substantially to deprive him of” his legitimate expectations will be
something that results in that detriment, regardless of whether it is
foreseeable or not. A grave detriment is a grave detriment after all,
regardless of its foreseeability. This illogicality produces a similarly
illogical outcome: Even though the non-breaching party is substantially
deprived of his legitimate expectations, he cannot avoid the demolished
contract when the detriment is not foreseeable. Must a buyer pay for junk?

B. Restrictions on the Type or Content of Expectations by Legitimacy
This section deals with the type or content of the injured party’s
expectations regarding its counterparty’s performance of contract, setting
aside for a while the issue of the substantiality of the deprivation which will
be discussed in the next section. As we have seen in the last section, the
foreseeability test is based on the notion of the culpability of the breaching
party. Consequently, concerning the type or content of the injured party’s
expectations, the nub of the notion is that it is unjust for a breaching party to
be forced to endure the hardship of the injured party’s avoidance when he
did not foresee, and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen, that the injured party would have a
certain type of expectation from the contract and that this expectation would
be frustrated by the breach.
“[A] reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances” is
construed to be “a reasonable merchant” in the same circumstances.
“Ordinarily this will mean merchants with a reasonable degree of

14.
There is another argument against avoidance in unforeseeable situations: It would
be anomalous for article 49 to grant the remedy of avoidance for the unforeseeable
consequences of a breach, while damages are not granted for them by article 74, which
provides that “damages may not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to
have foreseen at the time of the conclusion of the contract.” In other words, it would be
incongruous “if a party could take the radical step of avoiding the contract on the basis of
consequences for which it could not even recover damages.” Robert Koch, The Concept of
Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale
of Goods (CISG), in 1998 REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 177, 322 (Pace International Law Review ed. 1999). The
unavailability of damage claims for unforeseeable loss has more affinity with avoidance than
maintenance of contract, because the unavailability of damage claims and avoidance
commonly treat unforeseeable situations as belonging to the exterritorial sphere of contract
where the parties are released from their contractual obligations.
15.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
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knowledge and experience in their trade, including knowledge of the
16
relevant market conditions, whether regional or global.” Where even such
a knowledgeable merchant would not have foreseen the result of a breach,
the breaching party has a good reason to resist avoidance by the other party.
For him, avoidance is “a bolt from the blue” and he might say, “Little did I
dream that you would have such expectations.”
Article 25 provides a safeguard against this bolt from the blue through
what this author calls the “legitimate expectation test.” This test restricts
avoidance to situations where the injured party’s expectations do not exceed
“what [that party] is entitled to expect under the contract.” Notably, article
17
25 does not say “what [the injured party] expects under the contract.”
What a party is entitled to expect under the contract is different from what it
does expect under the contract.
For example, Seller S concluded a contract with Buyer B over the
phone to sell B 15 units of computer parts. B unjustifiably had a
misconception that the amount was 50 units. (The confirmation fax sent by
S after the phone call clearly indicated “15 units,” but B overlooked it.) S
delivered 15 units to B. B found that all 15 units were seriously defective. B
refused to pay, avoiding the contract. B’s avoidance is justified on the basis
that all of the delivered units were seriously defective but not because he
was “entitled to expect” 50 units (as he subjectively expected) instead of 15
18
units. (Had all 15 units been without defect, B’s avoidance would not be
justified.)
The injured party’s legitimate expectations should be determined
primarily by what the parties have explicitly or impliedly agreed in the
19
contract. Determination of the content of the contract, and hence

16.
Andrea Björklund, Article 25, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG): A COMMENTARY 337, 344, ¶ 22 (Stefan Kröll et al.
eds., 2 ed. 2018) [hereinafter UN COMMENTARY]; see also Andrew Babiak, Defining
Fundamental Breach Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 113 at 122 (1992) (“Since parties to contracts
involving international sales are presumed to be merchants, a ‘reasonable person’ may be
construed as a reasonable merchant. A reasonable merchant would, therefore, encompass all
merchants that satisfy the standards of their trade and that are not intellectually or
professionally substandard. The phrase ‘of the same kind’ refers to a merchant in the same
business, doing the same functions or operations as the party in breach. The requirement that
the reasonable merchant be ‘in the same circumstances’ refers to the market conditions, both
regional and world-wide.”).
17.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
18.
An ad hoc working group on First Committee Deliberations at the 1980 Vienna
Diplomatic Conference proposed that a breach is “fundamental” “if it results in such detriment
to the other party as will substantially impair his expectations under the contract.” In a twentytwo to eighteen vote, the majority of delegations agreed to this definition, with three of them
explicitly noting that the reference to a party’s expectations under the contract added an
additional element of objectivity to the definition. See JOHN O. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 550–51 (1989).
19.
See Koch, supra note 14, at 262–63.
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demarcation of a party’s legitimate expectations, is primarily a matter of
contract interpretation. Therefore, it is subject to the general interpretive
20
rules of the CISG provided in article 8:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his
intent where the other party knew or could not have been
unaware what that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by
and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to
the understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as
21
the other party would have had in the same circumstances.
Paragraph (1) provides that a party’s subjective intent prevails “where
the other party knew or could not have been unaware” of it. For example, a
buyer has long ordered from a seller 1,000 units of certain goods every
month. One month, the buyer’s fax order form showed 10,000 units instead
of 1,000 units. Having received no notice of change, the seller assumed it
was a simple error and that the buyer’s intent was to buy 1,000 units as
usual. Under paragraph (1), this was appropriate: The seller knew of the
buyer’s intent, or at least could have been unaware of any changes in the
buyer’s intent.
Paragraph (2) provides that, when paragraph (1) does not apply, “the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind” prevails. In the
above example, if the buyer and seller had no long-term relationship, then
the seller would be in no position to infer the real intent of the buyer. and a
reasonable person of the same kind as S would understand that the amount
of the ordered units was 10,000, as shown in the order form.
To clarify how article 8 works to determine whether a party “is entitled
to expect under the contract” a certain interest, consider the following
example:
Seller S, engaged in producing and selling machine parts, concluded a
sales contract with Buyer B, an interior construction company, for 500
golden gears of certain types and sizes. After delivery, B found all the 500
gears had slight stains on their surface which lessened their gloss. The stains
were unremovable but had no adverse effects if they were used as parts of
machines. However, B intended to use them as parts of an artistic decoration
20.
See PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 178, art. 25 (Peter Schlechtriem ed. 1998) (“When
interpreting the contract, knowledge or foreseeability of the promisee’s expectations would
have to be taken into account also under Article 8(1) and (2).”); see also ZELLER, supra note
7, ¶13.27 (“Article 25 also includes a proviso, namely foresee-ability and knowledge that a
breach would result in substantially depriving the other party ‘of what he is entitled to expect’.
The expectations of the promise would have to be taken into account under Article 8(1) and
(2).”).
21.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1)–(2).
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exhibited in the entrance hall of a department store which had hired B for
the construction. B, simply filling out the order form on S’s website, did not
inform S of this special usage and that the luster of the gears was very
important for B. B considered the stains on the gears to be a fundamental
breach and declared the contract avoided. S did not know the importance of
the shininess of the gears.
In this example, one of the possible issues is whether B “is entitled to
expect under the contract” that the gears are free of stains and shiny enough
to be used for decoration. Applying article 8, B is not entitled to expect it.
According to paragraph (1), B’s intent to have gears shiny enough for
decoration is acknowledged in the interpretation of the contract only “where
the other party knew or could not have been unaware” of it. However, S did
not know B’s intent in the hypothetical situation posed above. Also, S
could have been unaware of B’s intent because S simply received B’s order
by website among many other orders for parts of machines.
Separately, according to paragraph (2), B’s intent may be
acknowledged when it accords with “the understanding that a reasonable
person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same
circumstances.” However, a reasonable person of the same kind as S would
not have the understanding that B would use the gears for decoration, given
that S only received B’s order through the website without any notice of its
special purpose.
The above reasoning establishes that the phrase “is entitled to expect”
imposes an objective restriction on the type or content of the buyer’s
expectations, the substantial deprivation of which may be considered a
fundamental breach. The phrase “is entitled to” manifestly limits
expectations to those objectively ascertainable or foreseeable ones. Even if a
non-breaching party was substantially deprived of some benefit that he tried
to obtain, so long as he was not “entitled to expect” it, it is a matter outside
of the ambit of article 25.
When a buyer’s expectations are illegitimate, we need not go on to
inquire whether the deprivation of those expectations was foreseeable or
not; it cannot form a basis of a fundamental breach. Thus, the foreseeability
test—used to absolve sellers of liability where they lack the requisite mens
rea to substantially deprive the buyer of the buyer’s legitimate
expectations—is not necessary to excuse sellers when they could not have
expected that their own behavior would constitute a breach. Instead, the
requirement of “is entitled to expect” can independently and affirmatively
22
screen out buyers’ illegitimate expectations. What is left on the sieve
cannot be a “bolt from the blue” for sellers. The breaching party can seldom

22.
See Schroeter, supra note 12, at 420, ¶5 (“During the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, it was subsequently not fully realized that by reducing the importance accorded to
‘substantial detriment’ in favour of determining detriment by reference to what the
promise . . . expected from the contract, ‘foreseeability’ had thereby lost its function as a
ground for excuse where loss was unforeseeable.”).
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have an opportunity to say, “I never foresaw that my breach would deprive
my counterparty of its illegitimate expectation,” because the counterparty is
not entitled to hold such an expectation in the first place, and therefore
cannot claim on it. The following observation is pertinent to this conclusion:
unforeseeability can be successfully invoked only when the
aggrieved party’s special interest in the performance of the violated
duty does not follow from the terms of the contract or from the
negotiations between the parties prior to the[ir] conclusion. In most
of the reported cases in which the courts found [a] fundamental
breach, however, the aggrieved party’s special interest was obvious
from the terms of the contract, or the aggrieved party was able to
prove that it had made clear its special interest during the contract
23
negotiations.
Essentially, in the very circumstances where the drafters of the
foreseeability test appeared worried that article 25 might be used to graft
liability onto unsuspecting sellers (when a buyer wanted something from its
purchase that the seller could not have predicted), article 25’s “legitimate
expectations” test is independently sufficient to protect sellers.

C. Requirement of Substantiality
The last section showed that the foreseeability test is unnecessary to
limit the type or content of the interest an injured party may expect from a
contract because the “entitled to expect” test performs a comparable
function. It also pointed out that in most cases parties are entitled to the
benefit of the bargain (or “special interest”) they expected. Cases are rare in
which both (1) parties are not entitled to their interest and (2) the
deprivation of that interest is unforeseeable. Therefore, the foreseeability
test, when applied to the type of expectation, plays a limited analytic role.
Yet, the foreseeability test may still have another culpability-gauging
function, i.e., limiting the type of the deprivation itself by imposing a
criterion of substantiality on claims of fundamental breach. Beyond limiting
expectations to those of a foreseeable type or content, the foreseeability test
can be construed to impose the requirement that the magnitude, or the
substantiality, of a deprivation be foreseeable (e.g., by setting the amount or
proportion of defective goods required). From this perspective, the test
commands inquiry into whether a breaching party did not foresee, or a
reasonable person would not have foreseen, that the injured party’s (1)
deprivation of (2) legitimate expectations would be (3) substantial. Where a
buyer’s expectations are given to be legitimate, a breaching party may say,
“Little did I know how much my breach subverted your expectations.”
Where such a breach is “substantial,” the foreseeability test prevents the
aggrieved party from avoiding the contract.
23.

Koch, supra note 14, at 258.
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Let us consider the following example:
The seller, a trading company of agricultural products, agreed to
ship 5,000 bushels of grade no. 1 corn to the buyer, a producer of
cornflakes. But the seller actually delivered 5,000 bushels of grade
no. 2 corn. The corn of that grade is of no use for production by the
buyer. The seller offered to redeliver grade no.1 corn to the buyer
within a month. The buyer refused this offer because it would
materially delay its production schedule and avoided the contract.
In this example, it goes without saying that the buyer was deprived of
its legitimate expectations, i.e., a timely delivery of 5,000 bushels of grade
no. 1 corn and the profit arising from the production of cornflakes by using
it. Further, because the whole order of corn delivered was unusable, there is
no doubt that the deprivation was substantial. Likewise, the seller is a
trading company of agricultural products, and therefore it is inconceivable
that he “did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the
24
same circumstances would not have foreseen” such a result. It would be
hard to imagine that an expert merchant is ignorant of the fact that certain
product defects may substantially deprive the other party of what he can
legitimately expect. Rather, the more substantial the deprivation is, the less
likely it is that “merchants with a reasonable degree of knowledge and
25
experience in their trade” would fail to foresee it.
In my analysis, the instances in which the foreseeability test will be
used to determine the substantiality of a deprivation are limited, and the
instances in which it will weed out claims not already screened by the
legitimate expectations test are fewer still. Consider: The inquiry of
substantiality is necessary only for those kinds of expectations which have
been sifted through the legitimate expectations test. On the sifter are left
only those expectations which are reasonably cognizable. Accordingly, at
this stage, there seem to be few cases where a reasonable merchant fails to
foresee that the deprivation of legitimate expectations would be
26
substantial. Again, then, the foreseeability test has little to add over
affirmative requirements of article 25 in the legitimate expectations and
substantial deprivation tests.

24.
CISG, supra note 1 art. 25.
25.
Björklund, supra note 16, at 344.
26.
Nonetheless, one such example is given in Part III.A: Essentially, when seller acts
on background norms and customs of an industry that suggest certain literal terms of the
contract may be breached without consequence or at a slight price accommodation, if this
does not match the buyer’s particular expectations that the term be met exactly as written.
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III. The Time of Foreseeability and Parties’ Shared
Tacit Assumptions
A. Time of Foreseeability
There is one major, persistent problem with the foreseeability test (even
when deployed in the limited form discussed above to evaluate
substantiality): The time when foresight is required, i.e., when the breaching
party must foresee the result of his breach, is ambiguous. There are two
opposing views—one fixing the “time of foreseeability” at the time of
conclusion of contract, and the other taking account of later events. Insisting
that the time of foreseeability should be fixed at the time of the conclusion
of contract, Professor Schlechtriem expounds on his theory of foreseeability
as a substitute for certain contractual terms as follows:
In the author’s opinion, the role which foreseeability plays . . .
makes it clear that it is the time when the contract was concluded
that is decisive. The promisor’s knowledge or the foreseeability of
the promisee’s interest in individual contractual obligations and
methods of performance can be a ‘substitute’ for the need to reach
clear agreement in the contract on the importance of those matters,
i.e. it can make an appropriate interpretation of the contract
possible. However, the importance attached by a promisee to a
particular obligation, which has been shown otherwise than by
express agreement, must nevertheless be fixed by the time the
contract is concluded. If knowledge or foreseeability is to be
equivalent to express agreement, it must in any event exist at the
27
time when the contract was concluded.
In his theory, foreseeability must be a part of the contract or a substitute
for contractual terms. Therefore, whether the seller foresaw, or a reasonable
person would have foreseen, substantial detriment must be determined by
either the presence of an express contractual agreement or by inferring the
seller’s mental state at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
On the other hand, Professor Honnold argues that information acquired
after the conclusion of the contract is relevant to or even decisive of
foreseeability. He illustrates this through a hypothetical shipment of rice
bags:
S agreed to ship 100 bags of rice to B. B’s order was on a printed
form that specified “new bags.” When S prepared to ship, he had at
hand sound, used bags that he believed were of the same quality as

27.
SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 20, at 180. See also Ulrich Magnus, Beyond the Digest:
Part III (Articles 25–34, 45–52), in THE DRAFT UNCITRAL DIGEST & BEYOND: CASES,
ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION 319, 324 (Ronald
Brand et al. eds., 2004).
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new bags and would be acceptable to B subject to a modest price
allowance. However, before S bagged the rice, B telexed S, “Have
obtained contract for resale of rice which emphasizes use of new
bags. Although sound used bags would usually be acceptable
subject to a price allowance, use of new bags for this shipment is
very important.” S replied, “Shipping in extra high-quality used
bags.” B rejected the shipment and notified S that the contract was
28
avoided because of the danger of rejection by the sub-purchaser.
The gist of this example is that while S could not foresee a substantial
deprivation of B’s expectations at the time the parties concluded the
contract, substantial deprivation became foreseeable after B informed S of
the resale contract which emphasized new bags. In this example, Professor
Honnold demonstrates that the time of foreseeability provided in article 25
can shift from the time of the conclusion of the contract to the time of the
telex. According to his view, S could foresee, at the time of the shipment,
the substantial deprivation of B’s legitimate expectations. Hence, S’s choice
to ship the rice in used bags qualifies as a fundamental breach.
Respectfully, this example is flawed. The example makes clear that at
the time of the conclusion of the contract, the parties had a custom to treat
29
“sound used bags” as “new bags” with a price allowance. The telex sent by
B clearly indicates that they had customarily accepted sound used bags as
new bags. This interpretation of the word “new” is not objective, but
according to CISG article 8(1), the subjective usage shared by both parties
30
prevails over otherwise objective usages. Therefore, there was no breach
of the contract, even if S sent the rice in used bags. Because it was a part of
their contract that, subject to a price allowance, sound used bags were
acceptable for B, S’s choice to ship in sound used bags never
“substantially. . .deprive[d] [B] of what he [was] entitled to expect under the
31
contract.”
Instead, Professor Honnold’s example illustrates an offer to modify the
contract: B’s telex was an offer to modify the parties’ mutual agreement as
to the quality of bags. S rejected this offer, by replying, “Shipping in extra
high-quality used bags.” B’s offer to modify the contract failed, and both
parties remained bound to their original contract. B could neither reject S’s
32
delivery, nor avoid the contract.
28.
JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE
1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 276 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009).
29.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any usage to which they
have agreed and by any practices which they have established between themselves.”).
30.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1) (“[S]tatements made by and other conduct of a party
are to be interpreted according to his intent where the other party knew or could not have been
unaware what that intent was.”).
31.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 25.
32.
One commentator presents a similar hypothetical, suggesting that information
exchanged by the parties after the conclusion of the contract is relevant to their legitimate
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Yet, Professor Honnold has a point. Let us consider another version of
Professor Honnold’s hypothetical by deleting B’s telexed concession
(“[a]lthough sound used bags would usually be acceptable subject to a price
allowance”) to S. In this version, there is no such custom between the
parties as described in Honnold’s original hypothetical. This deletion
changes the story. At the time of the conclusion of the contract, B meant
literally new bags, while S plotted to send the rice in sound used bags,
subjectively thinking that this would be acceptable for B. Notice that in this
amended example, S intended to breach the contract, but thought that his
breach would be a minor one remedied by a price allowance. In other
words, he did not foresee that his breach would result in substantial
detriment to B. This situation was changed by B’s telex to S (“Have
obtained contract for resale of rice which emphasizes use of new bags. Use
of new bags for this shipment is very important.”) At this point, it became
foreseeable to S that his breach would substantially deprive B of his
legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, S replied, “Shipping in extra highquality used bags.” B rejected the shipment and notified S that he was
avoiding the contract because of the danger of rejection by the subpurchaser. Professor Honnold’s conclusion becomes pertinent in this
modified hypothetical:
[T]he information the seller received subsequent to the contract but
before shipment gave the seller reason to foresee that the breach of
contract would ‘substantially’ deprive the buyer of what he was
entitled to expect under the contract, and that the buyer’s avoidance
33
was justified under articles 25 and 49(1)(a).
Here, according to Professor Honnold’s view, the time of foreseeability
does shift from the time of conclusion of the contract to the time of B’s
telex. Knowledge or information obtained after the conclusion of contract
may therefore be relevant to determine foreseeability.

expectations. See Koch, supra note 14, at 321 (The buyer “could transform a contract, in
which the time of delivery is not fundamental, into a transaction where time is of the essence
of the contract by simply informing the seller that he has promised to sell the goods at a
particular time.”). This illustration also involves a unilateral offer to modify an explicit or
implied contract term as to the date of delivery, and the seller is not bound to it unless he
accepts the offer. See also Franco Ferrari, Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the UN
Sales Convention—25 Years of Article 25 CISG, 25 J.L. & COM. 489, 500 (2006) (“Allowing
for communications made after the conclusion of the contract to become relevant would
permit a unilateral modification of the balance of the parties’ interests as laid out in the
contract, which is hardly appropriate.”).
33.
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 277.
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B. Shared Tacit Assumptions and the Intrinsic Unreasonableness
of the Foreseeability Test
Professor Eisenberg’s “shared tacit assumption” theory sheds light onto
34
the discussion concerning the foreseeability test. While negotiating and
concluding a contract, parties share many tacit assumptions. These
assumptions may vary from “the sun will rise again tomorrow” to “the crude
oil price will be steady during the one-month life of the contract.” They are
a part of the contract in that the parties would not have made the contract, or
would have agreed otherwise, if they had been fully aware that the assumed
situations would not come about (“the sun will not rise tomorrow” or “the
crude oil price will sky-rocket in a month”). They are basic conditions of the
contract but are simply too basic to merit attention or mention. Professor
Eisenberg explains:
Shared tacit assumptions . . . are just as much a part of a contract as
explicit terms, so that where the risk of an unexpected circumstance
would have been shifted away from the promisor if the assumption
had been made explicit, an otherwise identical shared tacit
assumption should operate in the same way.
This approach to shared tacit assumptions is an application of the
usual hypothetical-contract methodology, under which unspecified
terms are usually determined on the basis of what the contracting
parties probably would have agreed to if they had addressed the
35
relevant issue.
According to Professor Schlechtriem’s interpretation of the
foreseeability test, which fixes the time of foreseeability at the time of
conclusion of the contract, if the parties are presumed not to have foreseen
the substantial detriment at the time of conclusion of contract, the contract
cannot be avoided. On the other hand, if we apply the shared tacit
assumption theory, the result would likely be the opposite. This theory
assumes that, if they had addressed the issue of an unforeseeable situation
resulting from a breach, it is very likely that, in most circumstances, the
parties would have agreed, “if a breach of our contact causes a detriment
more substantial than reasonable merchants like us could have foreseen, the
contract should be avoided.” This assumption seems supported in fact; it
represents what reasonable merchants will agree to if they do address the
36
issue of the unforeseeable consequence of a breach. It is also justified

34.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 207, 211–14 (2009).
35.
Id. at 214.
36.
See id. at 219 (The “shared-assumption test” “allocates away from the adversely
affected party the risk that a certain kind of unexpected circumstance will occur if the parties
share a tacit assumption that the circumstance will not occur.”).
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because it prevents an irrational consequence inherent in the foreseeability
test: leaving the fatally defective goods in the hands of the buyer without
relieving him of his obligation to pay.
Functionally, under the shared tacit assumption framework, one of the
biggest problems with the foreseeability test—the point at which a seller
must foresee the consequences of breach—is resolved, but the test itself
becomes still more useless: We do not need to know what the seller foresaw
if we can simply assume that the parties would wish to avoid contracts when
substantial detriment is unforeseeable.

IV. Searching for a Criterion of Substantiality
In Parts II and III, we saw that the role that the foreseeability test plays
is very limited, suggesting that the test brings irrational results even in the
narrow area where it can be applied: According to the foreseeability test,
when the consequence of a breach is unforeseeable cannot be avoided, and
this is often at odds with justice. Thus, the foreseeability test is useless at
37
best and paradoxical at worst. It is “an unfortunate historical mistake” and
38
should be nullified in the jurisprudence. Instead, I argue that courts and
parties alike should rely on parties’ good faith attempts to cure to determine
the fundamentality of the breach.
The foreseeability test is as good as dead. Please do not let it rule from
39
its grave. With foreseeability discarded, all that prevents article 25 from
being consistently applied are the questions we started with: What makes a
breach fundamental? When is a detriment substantial?

A. Lack of Administrable Criteria
Reading through cases hinging on fundamental breach under article 25
gives the impression that they were decided by hunch rather than by a
verbatim application of the letters of article 25. Surprisingly, some cases do
not quote from article 25 at all. Others do not even mention the words
“Article 25.”

37.
Schroeter, supra note 12, at 420, ¶5 (“[I]n fact [the foreseeability test] had become
superfluous—an unfortunate historical mistake, which has caused and still is causing some
confusion in the interpretation of Article 25.”).
38.
Tellingly, the nullification of the test is no big deal for the CISG jurisprudence
because the test rarely plays an active role. For example, Professor Epstein criticizes the
foreseeability test for ignoring commonplace assumptions of professional businessmen. See
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 124 (1989) (“Foresight here [in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 ENG.
REP. 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854)], like reasonableness in so many quarters of the law, utterly lacks the
descriptive content that allows it to be the principled basis for decision.”).
39.
See F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2 (A.H. Chaytor
& W.J. Whittaker eds. 1936) (“The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from
their graves.”).
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An example is the Germany Iron-Molybdenum Case. The buyer
contracted with the seller to deliver iron-molybdenum from China under the
international commercial shipping term (“Incoterm”) “CIF Rotterdam.”
Later, on several occasions, the seller demanded price increases for the
commodity, due to a rise in market price, each time missing and then
renewing the delivery date. The buyer avoided the contract and made a
substitute purchase, just as he had warned the seller he would.
The Appellate Court of Hamburg stated that the buyer’s special interest
(expectation) in the timely delivery could be inferred from the parties’ use
of Incoterm CIF “under which timely delivery is a fundamental obligation”
41
of the seller. The seller breached the obligation and “left the Buyer in
complete uncertainty as to whether and when it would comply with its
42
obligation to deliver.” Noting this, the court found a fundamental breach.
Although the court referred to articles 25 and 49, it did not quote from these
provisions, and it did not evaluate whether there was a substantial
deprivation of the buyer’s legitimate expectations.
43
Another example is the France Laminated Sheet Metal Case. The
laminated sheet metal that the seller delivered to the buyer failed to comply
with the contract both in quantity and quality, and the delivery was late by
more than one month. The Supreme Court of France (the Cour de
Cassation) listed the defects in the seller’s goods and quoted the expert’s
findings: “After all the tests and visual examination, I can affirm that the
sheets are absolutely unacceptable for the use for which they were
44
destined.” The Court held that “the goods delivered were not conforming,
in their definitive characteristics[,] with respect to those which had been
45
ordered,” and concluded that the buyer’s avoidance was well-founded. The
Court, however, did not quote from articles 25 or 49. It did not even
mention the titles of these articles.
On the other hand, the U.S. Compressors for Air-Conditioners Case is
an example in which a court duly specified the factors amounting to
substantial deprivation of legitimate expectations while quoting from article
46
25. The seller, a manufacturer of compressors for air conditioners, agreed
to sell 10,800 compressors to the buyer, a manufacturer of air conditioners.

40.
Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Provincial Court of Appeal] Feb. 28, 1997, 1 U 167/95,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970228g1.html (last updated Sept.
12, 2007) (Ger.) (Iron-Molybdenum Case).
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court] May 26, 1999, P 97-14.315, Arrêt no.
994 D, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990526f1.html (last updated
June 19, 2007) (Fr.) (Laminated Sheet Metal Case).
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Compressor Case).
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The contract provided for the delivery in three shipments. The seller made
the first shipment. While the second shipment was en route, the buyer
discovered that 93% of the compressors in the first shipment were nonconforming: They had less cooling capacity and consumed more electricity
than required by contract specifications. The buyer rejected the second
shipment and stored it at the port of delivery. After trying unsuccessfully to
cure the defects of the first shipment, the buyer demanded that the seller
reship conforming compressors, but the seller refused. The buyer declared
the contract avoided. The U.S. Court of Appeal held:
In granting summary judgment, the district court held that “[t]here
appears to be no question that [the buyer] did not substantially
receive that which [it] was entitled to expect” and that “any
reasonable person could foresee that shipping non-conforming
goods to a buyer would result in the buyer not receiving that which
he expected and was entitled to receive.” Because the cooling
power and energy consumption of an air conditioner compressor
are important determinants of the product’s value, the district
court’s conclusion that [the seller] was liable for a fundamental
47
breach of contract under the Convention was proper.
Thus, the court, properly quoting from article 25, duly enumerated
aggravating factors of a breach and concluded that this situation qualified as
substantial detriment.
However, even reasoning like this, which cites to article 25 directly,
appears to be lacking something. We still do not have a criterion to
determine “how bad is bad.” We still need to know how many of the
enumerated, injurious factors are required or how serious they must be to
satisfy the requirement of substantial detriment. In other words, there needs
to be an interpretative criterion that tells us when to apply the text of article
25 to the facts of the case at hand.
To see why this is so, consider by analogy CISG article 39(1), which
provides: “The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the
goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the
lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or
48
ought to have discovered it.” What “a reasonable time” means in this
49
provision has long been a subject of controversy. There is one potential
50
criterion which sets the limit at one month. That is, if the buyer gives the
seller notice of non-conformity within a month, his notice is regarded as
given within a reasonable time, so he does not lose the right to rely on the

Id. at 1028–29.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 39(1).
See Ingeborg Schwenzer, National Preconceptions That Endanger Uniformity, 19
PACE INT’L L. REV. 103, 104, 109–11 (2007).
50.
Id. at 111–24.
47.
48.
49.
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51

non-conformity and can claim damages based on it. If a court adopts this
criterion in applying article 39(1), its analysis will have two stages: It must
first articulate the prevalent rule that a reasonable time of notice is one
month. and then it must ascertain whether the delay involved in the case at
hand is within that reasonable length of time (i.e., a month). If it is, the court
will consider notice properly given and allow the buyer to claim for
remedies for the non-conforming goods.
To determine the requisite level of substantial deprivation of a buyer’s
legitimate expectations, there appears to be no operable interpretative
criterion which judges can invoke. Without an interpretive guide, judges
will be limited to listing those detrimental factors which in their perception
52
should be sufficient to overcome the hurdle of substantiality. Criteria
suggested by courts include “when the purpose of the contract is endangered
so seriously that, for the concerned party to the contract, interest in the
53
fulfilment of the contract ceases to exist as a consequence of the breach,”
or when a breach “concern[s] the essential content of the contract, the
goods, or the payment of the price concerned . . . lead[ing] to serious
54
consequences to the economic goal pursued by the parties.”
Although these criteria might fit the facts of the cases where they were
announced, they are not only as abstract as the language of article 25 itself,
but they also seem to deviate from it. For example, unlike in the latter
criterion above, article 25 does not stipulate that a breach must concern the
“essential content” of the contract, and a breach of a minor term of the
contract, such as the manner of packaging, could still lead to a substantial
55
detriment.

51.
Id. I have suggested a criterion that is similar, but that varies in a critical way: a
rebuttable presumption that one month is “a reasonable time.” That is, if the buyer gives the
seller notice of non-conformity within a month, he is presumed to have complied with the
requirement of article 39(1). At the same time, the criterion allows for the seller’s rebuttal that
he has suffered substantial prejudice from the delay. That is, even when the buyer gives notice
of non-conformity within a month, he loses the right to rely on the non-conformity if delay
caused substantial prejudice to the seller. See Yasutoshi Ishida, CISG Art. 38 & 39 and
Japanese Commercial Code Article 526—Examination of Goods and Notice of Nonconformity: “One Month No Prejudice” Test, 56 HIMEJI L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2015).
52.
See, e.g., 71 F.3d. at 1028–29, supra note 46.
53.
Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLGZ] [Frankfurt Court of Appeal] Sept. 17, 1991, 5
U 164/90, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910917g1.html (last
updated Mar. 20, 2007) (Ger.) (Shoes Case).
54.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2000, 4C.105/2000,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/000915s2.html (last updated Feb. 16,
2007) (Switz.) (Egyptian Cotton Case).
55.
See BENJAMIN K. LEISINGER, FUNDAMENTAL BREACH CONSIDERING NONCONFORMITY OF THE GOODS 132 (2007) (“Where the buyer purchases the goods for resale
and the non-conforming packaging leads to the consequence that the goods cannot be
immediately resold—as in string transactions—within the buyer’s normal course of business,
the buyer is entitled to avoid the contract. Here, because of the circumstances prevalent in the
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However, judges are not to blame. As is rightly pointed out, “the
concept of fundamental breach depends upon the concept of substantial
deprivation, but a definition of the latter is not found in the provision,
leaving the interpreter without a benchmark as to the extent of deprivation
56
required to constitute a fundamental breach.” It may be impossible to
contrive a universal criterion which could bridge the language of article 25
and the unique facts of each case. The existence of a fundamental breach
depends on too many aleatory parameters that can vary depending on the
kind of transaction and of goods, and on the nature and extent of the breach
involved. These complexities seem to prevent any attempt to make a
universal criterion. Therefore, this article takes a different approach.

B. Substantiality of Deprivation in Terms of Availability of Remedy
The thesis of this article is that the curability of defects can play a role
in the substantial detriment test, and that the determination of curability
should be made by the parties, who are the most acquainted with their own
predicament. One might think that the substantiality of a deprivation
resulting from the non-conformity of goods could be represented by the
gravity of the goods’ defects. That is, the more defective the goods are, the
more the buyer is deprived of his legitimate expectation. This idea is wrong:
However defective the goods may be at the time of delivery, no substantial
detriment will ensue if the seller promptly tenders a wholesome substitute.
This makes sense: The availability of a remedy, not the gravity of initial
defects, corresponds to the extent of the buyer’s economic loss. That is, the
more easily a remedy is available, the less economic loss will fall on the
57
buyer. (Consider: Even if a machine made according to the buyer’s
specifications stays dormant after the buyer turns on its power, the machine
may be easily and quickly repaired by replacement of a simple part.) Thus,
the substantiality of a deprivation actually depends on the availability of a
reasonable remedy.
In challenge to the idea of incorporating availability of remedy into the
substantial detriment test, one might rightly think that there are infinite
degrees of remediability. To marshal this complication, this author suggests
the following methodology: In Part V, this article considers the two

commodity trade, any delay caused by packaging or repackaging the goods would lead to an
unreasonable delay and expose the buyer to unreasonable risk.”).
56.
Eduardo Grebler, Fundamental Breach of Contract Under the CISG: A
Controversial Rule, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 407, 409 (2007). Professor Zeller further
pointed out that the term “detriment” in article 25 also “takes on substance within a particular
context only, that is, within a contract.” ZELLER, supra note 7, ¶13.29.
57.
See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 689
(2018) (explaining that to determine the applicability of avoidance, “four dimensions should
be taken into account: the likelihood of future performance by the promisor, the economic
significance of the breach, whether the breach was opportunistic, and the possibility of
cure.”).
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extremes on the spectrum of remediability—goods easily obtainable,
resalable, or repairable, on the one hand, and goods irreparably defective on
the other. There arises no substantial detriment in the former, and a judge
can readily admit a fundamental breach in the latter.
Between these two ends, there are of course many sorts of remedies for
58
defective goods that elude a definite categorization. These nebulous cases
will be extensively scrutinized in Part VI. In general, the most flagrant
breach by the seller is non-delivery of the goods. However, problems
concerning non-delivery or late delivery are excluded in the following
analyses, with some exceptions, because they seldom raise a serious
59
question of whether a deprivation was substantial.

V. Testing Remedy as a Criterion: Goods Easily Obtainable,
Resalable, or Repairable and Goods Irreparably Defective
As explained in the last section, I recommend evaluating availability of
remedy through four categories of defective goods: (1) those that are easily
obtainable or resalable, (2) those that are easily repairable, (3) those that are
irreparably defective, and (4) those that are in between, i.e., those that are
possibly repairable or substitutable. In this part, the first three categories are
considered. The fourth category, which requires extensive analysis, will be
discussed in Part VI.

A. Easily Obtainable or Resalable Goods
A sales contract for commodities or fungible goods will not usually
raise the issue of the substantiality of the seller’s breach because the
drawbacks of such a breach can usually be covered by a substitute contract,
which buyers can relatively easily obtain upon a seller’s breach. Professor
Leisinger demonstrates this in his definition of “commodity”:
The term “commodity” includes a broad field of products ranging
from oil to bulk chemicals to wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, cotton,
lumber, gas, propane, orange juice, RAM chips, copper, lead, gold,
and even pork bellies. What all these goods have in common is that
they are produced in very large quantities, by many different
producers and that they are considered substitutable. They are

58.
For a thorough list of factors to be considered in determining a fundamentality of
breach, see generally Koch, supra note 14.
59.
This is because the buyer can extend the period of delivery by a reasonable length
according to article 47(1), and, if the seller fails to deliver within that period, the buyer can
avoid the contract under article 49(1)(b), without getting into the question of fundamental
breach (or substantial detriment). CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1)(b) (“The buyer may declare
the contract avoided . . . in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within
the additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47
or declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed.”).

Spring 2020]

Identifying Fundamental Breach

85

interchangeable. The broadest definition of commodities is
60
“anything that has a use value.”
He also explains the reasons why a breach of a commodity contract
rarely becomes fundamental. First, as to a discrepancy of quantity, he states:
In the trade of commodities, where there are an almost unlimited
number of substitutable sellers selling exchangeable goods. . . . [i]f
the seller delivers a quantity less than the one contracted for, there
can never be a fundamental breach of the contract. The reason for
this is that in such a situation the buyer can always be expected to
cure the defect himself by purchasing the missing quantity, for
61
example, on the spot/cash market, and to then claim damages.
62

The Germany Computer Parts Case is illustrative. The buyer
concluded a contract for the sale of eleven computer parts with the seller.
The buyer was planning to use them to fulfil an order placed by his client.
After delivery of five parts, the buyer refused payment and declared the
contract avoided on the grounds that six parts remained undelivered. The
German district court held that even the delivery of only five parts out of
eleven would not entitle the buyer to avoid the contract in its entirety,
because the buyer’s declaration of avoidance did not meet the requirement
of CISG article 51(2), which provides, “The buyer may declare the contract
avoided in its entirety only if the failure to make delivery completely or in
conformity with the contract amounts to a fundamental breach of the
63
contract.” The court further held that in order to achieve the purpose of the
contract in cases of a breach by the seller, the buyer may be expected to
make a substitute transaction. Since it turned out that the buyer had already
obtained the missing six parts by a substitute purchase before he avoided the
contract, the court found that no fundamental breach was committed. The
real reason for the buyer’s avoidance was the withdrawal of his client’s
order.
This case is very instructive in three ways. First, a shortage of the
agreed quantity was in fact held not to constitute a fundamental breach—in
64
accordance with Professor Leisinger’s position reported above. Second,
the amount of the shortage as a proportion of the total order is not directly
connected to the gravity of the breach. In the above case, six out of eleven
parts were not delivered. The rate of failure was approximately 55%. This
60.
LEISINGER, supra note 55, at 114–15.
61.
Id. at 126–27. However, a fundamental breach may occur if the buyer and/or the
seller refuse substitution even though it can reasonably be made. These cases are discussed in
Sections D and E of Part VI below.
62.
Landgericht Heidelberg [LG] [District Court of Heidelberg], July 3, 1992, O 42/92
KfH I, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920703g1.html (last updated
Mar. 20, 2007) (Ger.) (Computer Components Case).
63.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 51(2).
64.
See LEISINGER, supra note 55, at 126–27.
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might seem sufficient to be recognized as a substantial deprivation of the
buyer’s legitimate expectations on a quantitative basis. However, the court
rightly held that the breach was not fundamental, because, by the substitute
purchase, the buyer’s aim was attained. Third, this case shows that
curability of breach can function as a proxy for the substantiality test, just as
this article advocates.
As to a non-conformity of quality, Professor Leisinger explains, if the
buyer purchased commodities for a particular purpose known to the seller,
and if they cannot be used for this purpose, the buyer must purchase
65
additional goods of the right quality and hence may avoid the contract.
However, he argues, if the buyer has not purchased the commodities for any
particular purpose, but merely for the general purpose of resale, the buyer
66
must not be allowed to avoid the contract as long as she can resell them.
67
The Switzerland Meat Case is illustrative on this point. The frozen
meat that the seller delivered to the buyer, a wholesaler of meat, contained
significantly more fat and water than the agreed standard and was estimated
to be worth 25.5% less than the meat specified by the contract. The buyer
argued that by the local food trade standard, a disparity of greater than 10%
allows the buyer to avoid the contract. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court
held that the gravity of a deviation of quality is not dispositive, and that
whether further processing is possible and reasonable in the particular
circumstances is relevant to the case’s disposition. Furthermore, because the
buyer was a wholesaler who could resell the meat in his usual course of
business, without an unreasonable effort—albeit with a markdown—the
Court denied avoidance.

B. Easily Repairable Goods
In cases where non-fungible goods are involved, such as a machine
made according to specifications provided by the buyer, a fundamental
breach will rarely be identified if the defect of the goods is a relatively
benign one which can easily or obviously be repaired. For example, even if
a machine specifically designed for the buyer’s production line stays
dormant after turning on the power, it may be easily and quickly repaired by
the replacement of a simple part. In that case, there is no fundamental
breach and avoidance is inappropriate.
One such case is the French Used Warehouse Case, where the buyer
declared the contract avoided because the metal parts of a portable
65.
The buyer must obtain substitute goods, but he will not have much difficulty in
procuring them in the market so long as they are fungible. The same is true of the seller, who,
in case of the avoidance by the buyer, can easily find another buyer. LEISINGER, supra note
55, at 129–30.
66.
See id. at 130.
67.
Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Oct. 28, 1998, 4 C. 179/1998/odi,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/981028s1.html (last updated Nov.
15, 2007) (Switz.) (Meat Case).
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68

warehouse were defective. The French Court of Appeal (Cour d’appel)
held that “[s]ince that defect related to only part of the warehouse and
concerned metal elements which could be repaired, it did not constitute a
fundamental breach such as to deprive the buyer of what he was entitled to
69
expect under the contract.”

C. Irreparably Defective Goods
The two categories above concern cases where it is relatively obvious
that the seller’s non-compliance does not constitute a fundamental breach.
We now turn to the cases where the converse is true: It is relatively obvious
that the seller’s non-compliance indeed constitutes a fundamental breach.
In some of these cases, the goods sold and delivered can be described as
irreparably defective because their defects are so serious as not to allow for
any use or cure. An example of defects falling into this category is present
70
in the Netherland Wheat Flour Case. The seller concluded a contract for
the sale of wheat flour with the buyer, an international trading company.
Upon delivery, it was confiscated by the authorities because the seller had
added to the flour a bread-enhancing substance containing potassium
bromate, an additive prohibited in the European Union as a genotoxic
carcinogen. The buyer declared the contract avoided. The District Appeal
Court in the Netherland found the seller’s breach fundamental.
It is indisputable that the goods involved were irreparably defective.
The wheat flour that the seller delivered to the buyer was confiscated by the
authorities because it contained a prohibited substance. It is true that wheat
flour is a kind of commodity or fungible good, and that both parties were
trading companies, but the buyer could not possibly resell the goods
confiscated by the authorities because of the ingredient causing cancer.
71
Another example is the Germany Sport Clothing Case. The sportswear
that the buyer had bought from the seller and resold to customers became
distinctly smaller, shrinking one to two sizes, after being washed them for
the first time. As a result, the end customers could no longer wear the
68.
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Grenoble Apr. 26, 1995 93/4879,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950426f2.html (last updated Dec. 2,
2005) (Fr.) (Used Warehouse Case).
69.
Id. See also, UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 115, art. 25, ¶9, (2016),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG_Digest_2016.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Digest] (“Some courts have held that easy repairability precludes finding a fundamental
breach.”).
70.
Hof’s–Gravenhage 23 april 2003, NJ 2003, 713 m.nt. (Rynpoort Trading &
Transport NV et al/Meneba Meel Wormerveer B.V. et al.), translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030423n1.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2005) (Neth.) (Wheat
Flour Case).
71.
Landgericht Landshut [LG] [District Court of Landshut] Apr. 5, 1995, 54 O 644/94,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950405g1.html (last updated March
20, 2007) (Ger.) (Sport Clothing Case).
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clothes after washing; they were irreparably defective, with no room for
cure.
72
Yet another example is the Germany Used Shoes Case. The buyer, a
company based in Kampala, Uganda, bought used shoes from the seller. The
contract provided for delivery “FOB Mombasa, Kenya.” After the goods
arrived at Mombasa, the buyer had the goods transported to Kampala,
Uganda, where he examined them. Upon examination, the buyer discovered
that the consignments contained only defective and unusable shoes and shoe
storage accessories, including high-heeled shoes, inline-skates, and shoe
trees. In addition, the Uganda National Bureau of Standards disapproved the
import of the shoes because of their bad and unhygienic condition,
recommending their destruction. The buyer declared the contract avoided.
73
The District Court in Frankfurt found a fundamental breach by the seller.
74
In these cases, in contravention of article 35 of the CISG, the goods
failed to comply with the specifications of their contracts and were not only
unfit for ordinary purpose but also for any particular purpose. In other
words, the defects were so serious as to make the goods entirely useless. In
these circumstances, the pecuniary loss which the buyers suffered is not
72.
Landgericht Frankfurt [LG] [District Court of Frankfurt] Apr. 11, 2005, 12/26 O
264/04, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050411g1.html (last updated
Dec. 10, 2008) (Ger.) (Used Shoes Case).
73.
However, the court denied relief on the ground that the examination of the goods
and notice of non-conformity were too late and that the buyer was precluded from relying on
non-conformity according to article 39(1). As to the details of this case and the irrationality of
the decision, see Ishida, supra note 51, at 15–23.
74.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 35, which provides:
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner
required by the contract.
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with
the contract unless they:
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would
ordinarily be used;
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the
seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for
him to rely, on the seller’s skill and judgement;
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as
a sample or model;
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where
there is no such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the
goods.
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limited to the total loss of the proceeds the buyer had expected from the
transaction, but it may also include the future loss of profit resulting from its
75
vitiated reputation. There is no doubt that the buyer had a right to avoid the
contract.
The following quote from the UNCITRAL Digest pertinently sums up
these findings:
Leading court decisions on what constitutes a fundamental
breach . . . have held that a non-conformity concerning quality is
not a fundamental breach of contract if the buyer can, without
unreasonable inconvenience, use the goods or resell them, even
with a rebate. Thus, e.g., the delivery of frozen meat that contained
too much fat and water . . . was deemed not to constitute a
fundamental breach of contract because the buyer could resell the
meat at a lower price or could process it in an alternative manner. If
non-conforming goods cannot be used or resold with reasonable
effort, however, there is a fundamental breach. The same is true
where the goods suffer from a serious defect, even though they can
still be used to some extent (e.g. flowers that should have
flourished the whole summer but in fact did so only for a small part
of the season), or where the goods have major defects and the buyer
requires the goods for its manufacturing processes. Similarly,
where the non-conformity resulted from the adulteration of the
goods in a fashion that was illegal in the states of both the seller
76
and the buyer, a fundamental breach was found.

VI. Identifying a Line in the Sand of Substantiality:
A Good Faith Duty to Cure Defects
This part tackles the most formidable problem for courts in identifying
fundamental breaches: cases in which the gravity of a defect reaches a
sufficient level that the buyer could invoke the right to declare the contract
avoided, but in which the remediability of the defect cannot be easily
determined. Generally, these cases involve goods which are neither easily
obtainable, resalable, or repairable, nor irreparably defective. As Part V
demonstrated, judges can readily deny a fundamental breach in the former
case and affirm one in the latter. But between these two poles, there is chaos

75.
See Nicholas Whittington, Reconsidering Domestic Sale of Goods Remedies in
Light of the CISG, 37 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 421, 435 (2006) (In determining the
fundamentality of breach the “economic loss of the nonbreaching party is likely to be the most
prominent of these considerations. But, in addition, the question can encompass the
consideration of factors such as loss of the nonbreaching party’s reputation. . . .”), available at
http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/VUWLawRw/2006/20.html.
76.
UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 69, at 222, art. 46, ¶13, (2016),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/clout/CISG_Digest_2016.pdf.
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in which judges will have a hard time determining whether the breach has
caused substantial detriment.
It seems next to impossible to formulate a criterion capable of
consistent application. Once judges have decided to acknowledge
substantial detriment, they can itemize those facts in their case which tend
to justify avoidance. Once they have decided no detriment is present, they
will hold that the aggravating factors that the buyer’s lawyer has
enumerated are insufficient to form a fundamental breach. In general, those
decisions cannot help becoming arbitrary because there is no universal,
objective criterion, and there are innumerable kinds of factors, from
manifold transactions, that may or may not contribute to substantial
detriment. The presence of substantial detriment depends on so many
parameters as to freeze any attempt at clear-cut definition.
Yet if we look more abstractly, removing ourselves from the dismaying
complexities in this middle field, we will find that the kernel of the problem
is technical rather than legal. This is where this article offers a solution: The
quandary of what constitutes a substantial detriment can be overcome by the
substitution or repair of goods. If a malfunctioning machine has been
successfully repaired, there is no substantial detriment and hence the buyer
has no grounds for avoiding the contract. If such an attempt has failed, then,
depending on how much it accomplished, the buyer may have no choice but
to avoid the contract.
Unfortunately, however, there is no provision in the CISG which
obliges the parties to attempt to cure a shipment’s defects. One of the
relevant provisions, article 46(2), says that “the buyer may require delivery
77
of substitute goods.” Another relevant provision, article 48(1) says, “the
78
seller may . . . remedy . . . any failure to perform his obligations.” Literally
read, these provisions imply that the parties do not necessarily have to
attempt to cure the defects. The CISG Advisory Council in its opinion No.5
advocated, “There is no fundamental breach where the non-conformity can
be remedied either by the seller or the buyer without unreasonable
inconvenience to the buyer or delay inconsistent with the weight accorded
79
to the time of performance.” However, even if the non-conformity can be
remedied in a reasonable manner, the seller and the buyer may leave it as it
is. What if the seller can remedy the non-conformity, but he will not? Is the
buyer precluded from avoiding the contract because there is no fundamental
breach so long as the non-conformity can be remedied?
The discussion that follows demonstrates that the obligation to remedy
is imposed both on the seller and the buyer under CISG articles 25, 46(2)

77.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2) (emphasis added).
78.
Id. art. 48(1) (emphasis added).
79.
Opinion no. 5 of the CISG Advisory Council, The Buyer’s Right to Avoid the
Contract in Case of Non-Conforming Goods or Documents (May 7, 2005), reported by
Ingeborg Schwenzer, Professor of Private Law at University of Basel (emphasis added).
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and (3), and 48(1), buttressed by the good faith principle provided in article
7(1).

A. Possibility of Cure and the Right of the Buyer to Avoid
As discussed above, article 49 provides in part: “The buyer may declare
the contract avoided: (a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his
obligations under the contract or this Convention amounts to a fundamental
80
breach of contract.” Courts and commentators generally agree that initial
defects of goods do not constitute a fundamental breach that entitles the
buyer to avoid the contract, if there is a possibility that the seller can remedy
81
those defects. Further, one of those commentators writes:
The result is the same if the view is taken that the buyer’s right to
avoid is suspended so long as substitute delivery or cure is possible
and genuinely offered and the time needed to make substitute
delivery or to repair will not in itself lead to a fundamental breach
82
by exceeding the contractually-agreed date for delivery.
The rationale of this opinion is based on the idea that, however serious a
breach may be initially, so long as it is curable, it does not substantially
deprive the buyer of his legitimate expectations and hence is not qualified as
a fundamental breach. In other words, “the preconditions for a fundamental
breach of contract (articles 25 and 49(1)(a)) generally do not exist as long as
83
the preconditions” of remedial measures are met. This opinion is based on
three assumptions. The first is that whether the cure is actually possible can
be determined at the time of delivery or shortly after it. Second is that the
cure is reasonably practicable with moderate cost and time. Third is that the
parties will undertake to cure.
The opinion appears to be basically correct as a matter of law, but, as
the CISG has been commonly understood until this point, two of these three
assumptions about the availability of cure are suspect. First, in cases where
fundamentality of breach is questioned, whether a defect is reasonably
curable cannot always be judged at the time of delivery. In some cases, it
cannot conclusively be determined until the seller’s attempts to cure are
borne out. If the attempts turn out to be futile, the buyer will have unduly
been waiting for nothing, suspending its right to avoid in vain. In other
words, what seemed to be curable defect at first was not curable in fact. The
buyer could have avoided immediately after the delivery and arranged for a
cover purchase. On these grounds, this approach lacks a supplementary
theory which justifies obliging the buyer to wait.

80.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1).
81.
Schroeter, supra note 12, at 445–46, ¶ 47.
82.
Id.
83.
Markus Müller-Chen, Article 48, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12,
at 770, ¶ 18.
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Second, there appears to be no provision of the CISG, read alone, that
obliges the buyer and seller to attempt to cure the defects. Article 48(1)
84
provides that the seller “may” remedy his failure to perform. In ordinary
meaning, the auxiliary verb “may” implies that the seller does not
necessarily have to cure if he does not so wish. Maybe he will, or maybe he
will not, even if at the time of delivery, the defect is clearly and definitely
curable with minimum cost, within a reasonable time. In the same vein,
article 46, sections (2) and (3) provide that the buyer “may” require the
85
seller to deliver substitute goods or to repair defective goods. The buyer
does not necessarily have to do so if he does not so wish. Maybe he will
require remedy by the seller, or maybe not if he wishes to avoid the
contract.
A drastic remedy like avoidance should not depend on such
indeterminate and unforeseeable conduct by the parties. If measures for cure
are to survive an immediate avoidance by the buyer, we need to contrive
interpretations of the relevant provisions of the CISG which will oblige the
seller and the buyer to attempt to remedy the seller’s non-compliance.
Moreover, an obligation to cure may dispense with troubles and burdens for
the seller entailed in the avoidance by the buyer. For in case of avoidance,
the seller not only misses the profit he expected from the sale but also must
bear the cost of storing the rejected goods and taking them back, and he
might also have to pay expectation damages to the buyer.
There are two issues relevant to this inquiry: the buyer’s right to require
the seller to cure the lack of conformity, and the seller’s right to offer to
remedy his failure. In the following sections, we will examine these rights
and convert them into obligations, with the help of the principle of good
faith.
84.

See CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1), which provides:

Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his
own expense any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without
unreasonable delay and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or
uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer.
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this
Convention.
85.

See CISG, supra note 1, art. 46, which provides:

(2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of
substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of
contract and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice
given under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller
to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having
regard to all the circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in
conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a reasonable time
thereafter.
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B. Buyer’s Right and Obligation to Require Repair
The buyer’s request to remedy can be fulfilled in two ways: substitution
or repair. For the sake of relative simplicity of explanation, we will deal
with the latter first. Article 46(3) provides in relevant part:
If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may
require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless
86
this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances.
As explained above, this provision does not oblige the buyer to require
87
the seller to repair the lack of conformity of the goods. He may require the
repair by the seller, and if he chooses to so require, such a request is
88
conditioned on the repair’s reasonableness under the circumstances.
It is to be noted that this buyer’s option to request repair is present in all
the cases where the goods do not conform to the contract, not just in the
89
case of a possible fundamental breach. However, relevant to our current
inquiry is the case in which the lack of conformity does appear to be a
fundamental breach, and in which it is disputed whether the buyer can resort
to an immediate avoidance. For this inquiry, at first, we need to examine
when a request for repair “is unreasonable having regard to all the
90
circumstances.” When considering whether a request is unreasonable:
[I]t is necessary to weigh the buyer’s interests in repair against the
seller’s expenses. If there is an objective disparity, repair is
unreasonable. This is the case in particular when the repair is
unreasonably expensive for the seller: the costs of repairing the
goods are disproportionately higher than the costs of acquiring a
substitute. . . . If the seller is a wholesaler or retailer and thus does
not have the technical, mechanical, or other skills necessary for the
repair, and if it is not easily possible for him to have a third party

86.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3).
87.
In the case of some minor defects, the buyer himself may fix it, or he may arrange
for repair by employing an expert in his vicinity, possibly at lower cost, and then demand
compensation for the cost from the seller. See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 414 (discussing
art. 46, § 284) (“Some minor repairs can be made more readily by the buyer, particularly
when the seller’s facilities for repair are in a distant country. The statutory language was
designed to encourage a reasonable and flexible approach to such cases.”).
88.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3) (“unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the
circumstances”).
89.
For example, article 35 of the CISG is the general provision for the conformity of
goods, requiring the goods to be of the quantity, quality and description specified by the
contract. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 35. For full text of Article 35, see supra note 74.
Likewise, article 45 provides in part: “If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under
the contract or this Convention, the buyer may (a) exercise the right provided in articles 46 to
52.” The fundamentality of breach is not prerequisite to the request of repair by the buyer
under article 46(3). See supra, text accompanying note 86.
90.
Id.
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do the work ([e.g.,] a contact repair centre), then repair is
91
unreasonable.
Suppose a case where the fundamentality of breach is at issue and the
reasons a repair might be unreasonable all are absent. In other words, the
precondition of reasonableness of repair is satisfied. What shall the buyer
do? He can choose to declare the contract avoided, because article 46(3)
says that he may; he does not have to require repair. True, if he does choose
not to ask for repair and to avoid the contract, he may have a duty to
92
mitigate damage to the seller. However, all article 77 can do with this kind
of avoidance is to allow the breaching seller “to claim a reduction in the
93
damages in the amount by which the loss should have been mitigated.” It
does not have the direct effect of prohibiting the buyer from relying on the
breach to declare the contract avoided. Yet an avoidance by the buyer under
this situation smacks of opportunism.
In my opinion, the principle of good faith, imported from CISG article
7(1), prohibits the buyer in the above circumstances from avoiding the
contract, and hence he is obliged to require the seller to repair. But I
acknowledge that good faith is an amorphous notion, and we should not
lightly resort to it. In the next section, the notion of good faith is examined
in the context of a buyer’s request for repair.

C. Principle of Good Faith in the Context of Article 46(3)
The provision of the CISG that imposes the good faith obligation is
article 7(1), which says, “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is
to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity
94
in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”
In determining the content of the amorphous notion of good faith, the
official record of article 7(1), i.e., the “travaux préparatoires[,] arguably are

91.
Markus Müller-Chen, Article 46, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12,
at 751, ¶ 40.
92.
Sometimes a repair by the buyer himself is required to mitigate damages. See
Victor Knapp, Article 77, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 563–64.
93.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 77 (“A party who relies on a breach of contract must take
such measures as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of
profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures, the party in breach may
claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have been
mitigated.”). See also Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 77, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER,
supra note 12, at 1105, ¶ 2 (“The duty to mitigate damages is not an enforceable obligation
under the contract, but rather a non-actionable duty to be taken in the aggrieved party’s own
interest. Failure to comply with the duty to mitigate damages does not result in the aggrieved
party’s liability for damages, but rather precludes recovery of any loss which could have been
avoided.”).
94.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
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predominantly of historical interest” only, rather than of practical use of
reference. What is worse, the case law on article 7(1) gives little guidance.
Professor Sheehy describes the judicial situation:
The tangle of cases seems to be making the waters ever murkier as
the various panels and courts continue to introduce patches of
domestic law and cobble together resolutions using the term “Good
Faith” without explaining its content or meaning in applications—it
being variously described as a general principle, a principle with
specific substance, or simply one of many things that makes one
party’s position more favourable to [one] adjudicator than another.
It may be that this mash of ideas more accurately reflects the reality
of judicial reasoning, but it certainly makes the merchant and the
legal advisor’s job more difficult. Without a single unifying
concept, arbitrary though it may be, the notion of Good Faith is a
nebulous notion probably causing more grief than it resolves,
introducing more uncertainty without the corollary benefit of
96
improving justice or fairness.
In addition, as Sheehy’s analysis suggests, we cannot resort to analysis
of comparable domestic law, which would undermine the “international
97
character” of the Convention. With no interpretive guidance, what is left
for us is no more than the phrase, “good faith.” We can but resort to the
definition of a dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the phrase
as “fidelity, loyalty . . .; esp. honesty of intention in entering into
98
engagements, sincerity in professions.”
With this definition in mind, how is the obligation of good faith to be
used in the context of the CISG? Good faith, connoting “honesty of
intention” or “sincerity in professions,” functions as an “overarching
99
principle” and can be utilized in an auxiliary way to finish tailoring
interpretations of other, more explicit provisions of the CISG. Prevention of
opportunistic avoidances should be regarded as part of article 7(1)’s good
faith principle because it is necessary to complete one of the general
100
101
principles of article 7(2) —keeping the contract alive. UNCITRAL
Digest explains:

95.
Bruno Zeller, Four-Corners—The Methodology for Interpretation and Application
of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 102 (May 2003)
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Melbourne), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
4corners.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2019).
96.
Benedict Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: The Interpretation Problems of Article
7, in REV. OF THE CISG 2005-2006 153, 193–96 (Pace Int’l L. Rev. ed. 2007).
97.
Article 7(1) provides in part: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to
be had to its international character.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
98.
Good faith, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
99.
Sheehy, supra note 96, at 187.
100.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2):
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[T]he Convention is based upon the favor contractus principle,
pursuant to which one should adopt approaches that favor finding
that a contract continues to bind the parties rather than that it has
been avoided. This view has also been adopted in case law. One
court expressly referred to the principle of favor contractus, while
one stated that the Convention’s general principles “provide a
102
preference for performance.”
The principle of good faith comes on the scene when an avoidance is
suspected to be an opportunistic one. Such an avoidance lacks “honesty of
103
intention [and] . . . sincerity in professions.” As is shown in the following
example, an opportunistic avoidance is an avoidance which has no or only a
dubious grounding in the contract and in law, and which is declared to
prevent loss or to gain profit from changed circumstances after the
conclusion of the contract—i.e. in those circumstances when the avoiding
party is better off avoiding than adhering to the contract:
Between the making of the contract and the time for performance
there may be wide swings in commodity prices. For example, from
September to November 1969, the price of beans rose from $180 to
$260 per long ton, an increase within two months of 44.4%.
Comparable dislocations result from swings in the value of
currency. In five days following 24 July 1978, the value of the U.S.
dollar in Tokyo dropped from 200.10 to 192.10 Yen; a $1,000,000
contract entered into on July 24, to be paid five days later, would
have involved a loss of 8 million Yen.
In such settings, the losing party views the contract with regret and
104
tends to look with a sharp eye to every aspect of the other’s performance.
In such a situation, the good faith principle can function to forestall an
expedient avoidance by the buyer, obliging him to have any non-compliance
remedied.

Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable
by virtue of the rules of private international law.
101.
102.

UNCITRAL Digest, supra note 69, art. 7, ¶ 32, at 45.
Id. See also ZELLER, supra note 7, ¶ 13.06:

The basic motivation of the CISG is to keep the contract alive as long as possible,
as the convention has recognized that cancelling a contract in international trade is
difficult and should be the remedy of last resort because it triggers the winding
back of associated contracts such as letters of credit. If any cure will prevent an
avoidance of a contract, the courts generally will so rule.
103.
104.

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 98.
Michida, supra note 10, at 279.
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Some will argue that, beginning with the phrase “In the interpretation of
this Convention,” article 7(1) on its face restricts the observance of good
faith to the interpretation of the CISG and seems not to directly govern the
105
conduct of the parties. After all, it is mainly judges who interpret the
CISG and hence who must evaluate the need to promote the observance of
good faith. But, take a step back: Article 7(1) is likely not a precept
requiring honesty or sincerity from a judge sitting on a CISG case and
106
interpreting its provisions. It would itself be absurd for any law to include
a redundant admonition for adjudicators not to make an absurd
interpretation. That would be like a public facility posting a sign prohibiting
tigers on its front door beside a no-dog sign.
Instead, it is “logically impossible to apply good faith to the Convention
107
as a whole without influencing or affecting the behavior of the parties.”
Article 7(1) requires a judge to scrutinize the conduct of the parties in
interpreting provisions of the CISG, because a judge never interprets a
provision abstractly but in terms of the facts of a concrete case for which he
108
is sitting. Those facts include the modes of conduct of the parties. Notice
that if a judge were to interpret a provision of the CISG to condone a bad
faith behavior by a party, that interpretation would be against the principle
of good faith. The view that good faith “is not to be limited to the
109
interpretation of the CISG itself is held by the majority of commentators.”
However, even as article 7(1) was being negotiated, delegates rightly
contended that the untrammeled application of an obligation of good faith
110
will lead to uncertainty and unpredictability. Therefore, it is desirable to
connect the duty of good faith in article 7(1) with other explicit provisions
111
of the CISG.
Let’s start with article 46(3). In Section B of this part, we saw that the
buyer’s ability to request repair under article 46(3) is conditioned on the

105.
As Professor Neumann argues, “good faith is understood as an instruction not to
read the Convention in a strict literal or absurd way.” THOMAS NEUMANN, THE DUTY TO
COOPERATE IN INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE SCOPE AND ROLE OF ARTICLE 80 CISG 28
(2012).
106.
See Mark Gergen, The Principle of Good Faith in Contract Law, in EISENBERG,
supra note 57, at 708 (“Good faith means sincerity in its Latin form bona fide.”).
107.
Zeller, supra note 95, at 102.
108.
See Koch, supra note 14, at 207 (“In practice, it appears to be nearly impossible to
apply this principle to the interpretation of the Convention without also applying it to the
parties’ conduct.”).
109.
Sheehy, supra note 96, at 165–66.
110.
The good faith principle in article 7(1) is a product of compromise between the
delegates who esteemed fair dealing of the parties and those delegates who feared its
ambiguous notion would lead to uncertainty. See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 134, art. 7, §
94.
111.
See Sheehy, supra note 96, at 167–68 (“It is not a substantive doctrine then to be
read into all contracts as an implied term, but a guide to thinking about whether and how other
terms should be read in to a contract, or applied to a particular fact pattern.”).
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absence of unreasonableness (“unless this is unreasonable having regard to
112
all the circumstances.”). The interpretation that article 46(3) obliges the
buyer to require the seller to repair is buttressed by the good faith principle.
Consider: When, taking account of all the circumstances, repair would be
reasonable, the buyer’s choice not to repair and to instead avoid seems
irrational and motivated by some reason external to the contract at hand.
Take, for example, a situation in which a machine that the buyer ordered has
turned out to be seriously flawed, but the seller is able and willing to repair
it in a relatively short time with moderate cost and in compliance with other
conditions of reasonableness. If the buyer, who has no special interest in
rigid punctuality of delivery, refuses an offer by the seller to repair, the
refusal smacks of an opportunistic avoidance in which the buyer takes
advantage of the defects as a pretext (e.g., the opportunity to purchase a
machine at a lower price which has better or comparable specifications).
Such an attempt lacks “honesty of intention” or “sincerity in professions” on
the part of the buyer and is contrary to the favor contractus principle of
article 7(2). Thus, the principle of good faith of article 7(1), in collaboration
with the general pro-contract principle of article 7(2), obliges the buyer to
113
require the seller to cure.

D. Buyer’s Right and Obligation to Require Substitute Goods
The buyer’s right to require substitute goods is provided in article 46(2),
which reads:
If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may
require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity
constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for
substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given
114
under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Can the buyer immediately declare the contract avoided before
requiring substitute goods on the ground that a non-conformity is a

112.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(3).
113.
A district court in Italy, in a case involving a defective machine, once stated that
avoiding the contract without granting a seller the opportunity to cure defects in the goods is
contrary to the principle of good faith which governs international transactions. See Trib. di
Busto Arsizio, 13 Dec. 2001, n.1192, translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/011213i3.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2012) (It.) (Machinery Case); see also Sheehy,
supra note 96, at 186–87.
114.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2). This provision is mainly meant for commodities or
fungible goods, along with goods that are mass-produced or for which replacements are
otherwise readily available. See also, Peter Huber, Article 46, in UN COMMENTARY, supra
note 16, at 682 (“Art. 46(2) entitles the buyer to claim delivery of substitute goods. This
means that the seller has to make a new tender of goods which conform to the contract. This
will usually not create major problems where generic goods are the subject matter of the
contract (e.g. oil, sugar, grain).”).
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fundamental breach? Unlike article 46(3) concerning repair, article 46(2)
does not impose a condition of reasonableness or feasibility on substitution.
And, in many cases, substitution “will cause hardship to the seller. He must
not only take back the delivered goods but also deliver substitute goods,
which necessarily involves the risk of damages or loss and expenses such as
116
transportation and storage.” And the buyer can often more readily procure
the same goods from another source. In such cases, it may be reasonable for
the buyer not to require the seller to tender a substitute.
The auxiliary verb “may” seems to imply that in some cases the buyer
does not have to require substitution and he can avoid the contract.
However, where the factors which make substitution unreasonable are
absent, as in the case of fungible goods readily delivered, the principle of
good faith acts to ensure that the buyer is not allowed to avoid the contract
but rather obliged to require substitution, by the same rationale explicated
on repair.

E. Seller’s Right and Obligation to Remedy His Failure and
Cross-Reference to Article 49
1. Seller’s Right and Obligation to Remedy His Failure
Now it has been demonstrated that the principle of good faith obliges
the buyer to require the seller to remedy his failure to perform, if certain
conditions of reasonableness are met. It is time to establish the seller’s
obligation to remedy under the same principle. It is better to quote here
again the full provision of article 48(1):
Subject to article 49, the seller may, even after the date for
delivery, remedy at his own expense any failure to perform his
obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of
reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer.
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided
117
for in this Convention.

115.
A separate problem is whether buyers can correctly judge the fundamentality of a
breach. See Michael Will, Article 46, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 337 (“The
buyer had to decide whether there was a breach of contract, and assume the risk of a wrong
decision on that point. Under Article 46(2) of the Convention he has a second decision to
make, namely whether the breach is a fundamental one. The risk of error on this second
decision is much greater because the question is more subtle.”). As we will discuss in Part
VII, this uncertainty may be resolved when both parties collaborate to cure.
116.
Koch, supra note 14, at 332.
117.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 48(1) (emphasis added).
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Let us put aside for a moment the cross-reference, “Subject to article
49,” because it involves a daunting problem and has been a target of
controversy among commentators and scholars.
Focus instead on the fact that, here again, the seller may remedy his
own failure to perform. The auxiliary verb “may” continues to connote that
the seller does not have to take this action if he does not want to. If he
decides not to remedy, the buyer will have the opportunity to avoid the
contract. However, the seller is not acting in a vacuum. Recall that applying
the good faith principle in our interpretation of articles 46(2)–(3), the buyer
is obliged to require the seller to remedy if all the conditions of a reasonable
and feasible remedy are met. Similar factors restrict when the seller may
remedy under article 48(1), limiting seller’s opportunity to remedy to
situations where “he can do so without unreasonable delay and without
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of
reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the buyer.” But just as
under article 46, if the requirements of reasonableness on both parties are
fulfilled, the seller’s rejection of the opportunity to remedy will manifestly
show his lack of honesty of intention or sincerity in professions. Applying
the principle of good faith, the seller will be driven into a tight corner where
he is obliged to remedy.

2. Cross-Reference to Article 49
Here, we come back to what we have put aside (specifically, the
formidable cross-reference “Subject to article 49”), as it is relevant to much
of what we have discussed above. At the Diplomatic Conference in Vienna
in 1980, the cross-reference replaced the clause, “Unless the buyer has
118
declared the contract avoided.” Professor Honnold explains:
[The] “[u]nless” clause might be construed to authorize avoidance
of the contract that would frustrate the seller’s right to cure. There
was widespread agreement that whether a breach is fundamental
should be decided in the light of the seller’s offer to cure . . . and
that the buyer’s right to avoid the contract (Art. 49(1)) should not
nullify the seller’s right to cure (Art.48(1)). However, it was
difficult to find language that would clearly express the proper
relationship between avoidance and cure. Finally, the Conference
adopted a joint proposal prepared by delegates who had been
anxious to protect the seller’s right to cure. Under this proposal, the
“Unless . . .” clause of the 1978 Draft was deleted and replaced by
119
the present cross-reference to Article 49.
If article 48(1) had retained the clause, it would be clearer that the
buyer’s right to avoid trumps the seller’s right to cure. Instead, the drafters’
118.
119.

See HONNOLD, supra note 18, at 686-87.
See HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 426.
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replacement with the cross-reference to article 49 implies that there are
cases where the buyer’s right to avoid must give way to the seller’s right to
cure.
Professor Will explains the still-unsettled problem:
The condition of non-avoidance raises the fundamental issue of
whether avoidance or cure should prevail. This question cannot be
answered with certainty, since the words “subject to Article 49” are
no clearer than the former “unless” clause which they replaced. The
relationship between article[s] 48 and 49 remains unsettled. Here
the interests of buyers and sellers clash so strongly that it seems
almost impossible to find a proper balance. In fact, the issue has
120
long been one of the most controversial in international sales law.
As explicated in Section A of this part, courts “have frequently held that
a curable defect of the goods does not in itself amount to a fundamental
121
breach, if there is the possibility that the seller may cure,” and most
commentators agree. On the other hand, if we read the cross-reference
literally and
[give] these words their ordinary and plain meaning, it appears that
the buyer’s right to declare the contract avoided in accordance with
article 49(1)(a) prevails over the seller’s right to cure. The
determination of fundamental breach in the light of any offer to
cure, however, would enable the seller to prevent the buyer from
avoiding the contract and would, therefore, actually allow the
122
seller’s right to cure to prevail over the buyer’s right to avoid.
The disparity of these two opposing views seems to lie in the difference
in the time during which a fundamental breach is identified. While the
former view grants a grace period for attempts to cure, the latter seems to
envision an avoidance declared immediately after the delivery or inspection
reveals defects, denying any grace period. The shortcoming of the literal
view is that it freezes the state of the defective goods as it is at delivery,
excluding any possibility of cure. However, even a defective machine that
does not turn on may be easily and quickly repaired by a replacement of
simple parts, just as a decayed crop may be readily substituted with a
wholesome one. The latter view fails to rationalize its blatant disregard of
this possibility—and of the drafting history which changed the “unless”
clause to a cross-reference.
Here, it would be best for us to appreciate what article 49 says. It says,
“The buyer may declare the contract avoided,” if non-conformity of goods
amounts to a fundamental breach. It does not say, “The buyer may avoid the

120.
121.
122.

Michael Will, Article 48, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 349.
Schroeter, supra note 12, at 445, ¶47.
Koch, supra note 14, at 323.
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contract.” Why does it bother to say the buyer may declare? One possible
interpretation is that the buyer cannot by himself conclusively determine
whether a breach qualifies as fundamental, i.e., whether the breach
substantially deprives him of his legitimate expectations. To make an
objective determination of fundamentality is very difficult, even for courts
and scholars. The buyer’s assessment may well be subjective and arbitrary:
What appears to be a fundamental breach for the buyer may be curable by
the seller, and hence the seller can turn it into a non-fundamental breach.
The buyer may also change his judgement regarding the fundamentality of
the breach in a remedial negotiation with the seller. Article 49(1) implies to
the buyer, “You may regard the breach as fundamental and declare the
contract avoided, but it may turn out to be curable afterward.” Ultimately, it
123
is a court that makes the final call.
Thus, the CISG leaves the initial judgement of fundamentality of breach
to the declaring party, and that judgement may later be corrected. This
interpretation also applies to article 46(2), which says, “If the goods do not
conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of substitute
goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of
124
contract.” In the absence of this interpretation, it may seem “paradoxical
that the buyer’s right to require delivery of substitute goods is available only
if there has been a fundamental breach of contract, [when] the fundamental
nature of the breach exists only if the defect has not been remedied by the
125
seller under Article 48 by delivery of substitute goods.”
This paradox is resolved by an interpretation that the first assessment of
fundamentality is made by the buyer, and that his assessment of
fundamentality of breach can be rebutted by the seller’s capability and
willingness to tender a substitute. Even if the defect is so serious as not to
allow for repair, but the seller can and does replace the defective goods with
sound goods, the breach ceases to be fundamental. If the seller is unable to
tender a substitute or to repair, the breach remains fundamental, and
therefore the buyer can avoid the contract. Under the theory by this author,
the buyer has an obligation to require the seller to cure and the seller has an
obligation to offer to cure.
As we will see in the next part, the buyer and the seller must make
collaborative efforts to cure defects. The CISG grants a grace period to the
final determination of fundamentality of breach. During the period, the
123.
If the buyer has wrongfully declared the contract avoided and quit performance, he
himself may be held liable for a fundamental breach. For a U.S. domestic case illustrating this
issue, see Walker & Co. v. Harrison, 81 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Mich. 1957) (“But the injured
party’s determination that there has been a material breach, justifying his own repudiation, is
fraught with peril, for should such determination, as viewed by a later court in the calm of its
contemplation, be unwarranted, the repudiator himself will have been guilty of material
breach and himself have become the aggressor, not an innocent victim.”).
124.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 46(2) (emphasis added).
125.
Markus Müller-Chen, Article 46, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12,
at 746, ¶ 28.
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buyer and the seller collaborate to make a final assessment of the curability
of the defect: If it is cured, there is not a fundamental breach, and if it is not,
there remains a fundamental breach and the buyer can avoid the contract.
Under this interpretation, the cross-reference does not mean that the buyer
can avoid the contract even though the defect can reasonably be cured. It is
a confirmatory reference, meaning the buyer retains the right to avoid the
contract if reasonable efforts to cure have turned out to be a failure.

VII. Collaborative Efforts to Cure Defects by the
Seller and the Buyer: Make Them Draw a Line
Some commentators argue for the existence of a general principle of
126
cooperation between parties in the CISG. In the same vein, the present
author advocates that there exists a principle of collaboration to cure
between the parties in the CISG. In this author’s interpretation of articles
7(1)(2), 25, 46 (2)(3) and 48(1), the seller is obliged to offer to cure, and the
buyer is obliged to require the seller to cure, non-conformity of the goods if
the conditions of reasonableness are met. The logical conclusion of this
interpretation is that the seller and the buyer should, in collaboration,
attempt to remedy non-conformity. “A policy that permits cure of breach
and generally fosters further dealing between the contracting parties after
contract breakdown, and which leaves the injured party whole, is . . .
127
desirable.” Such policies, like my own, will obviate substantial detriment
and save waste. Therefore, they represent rational economic behavior.
128
129
Naturally, and as noted in articles 38 and 39, it is the buyer that first
discovers non-conformity and informs the seller of it. Then, the seller, who
is more likely to have knowledge about the goods and their defects, will
usually advise the buyer about the nature of the defects. They will discuss
and negotiate how to deal with the problem. Feasibility of cure is a question
which entails diverse factors and forecasts, such as the degree of difficulty
of substitution and repair, probability of success, time needed, cost involved

126.
See NEUMANN, supra note 105, at 110 (“The principle of cooperation between the
parties exists in the Convention and is expressed in many provisions.”). Professor Neumann
argues that the principle of cooperation is embodied in (among others) the rules of
communication of information provided in Articles 39(1), 48(2), 65, and so on. See id. at 110–
16.
127.
Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the Deal Together After Material Breach–Common
Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REV. 553, 555 (1976).
128.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 38 (providing in part: “(1) The buyer must examine the
goods, or cause them to be examined, within as short a period as is practicable in the
circumstances.”).
129.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 39 (providing in part: “(1) The buyer loses the right to
rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the
nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or ought to
have discovered it.”).
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and so forth. These forecasts normally belong in the domain of the seller’s
expertise, and therefore it is up to the seller to make an initial decision. The
buyer may make his own decision in response, taking account of the time
and expense necessary for cure, the possibility of alternative deals, and so
forth.
The scope of this collaboration is not totally autonomous, but, as noted
above, is bounded by the explicit conditions imposed by relevant articles of
the CISG. These conditions are important in that they infuse reasonableness
and objectivity into the parties’ solution. The condition imposed on the
buyer’s right to request repair in article 46(3) is “unless this is unreasonable
having regard to all the circumstances.” The three conditions on the seller’s
right to attempt remedy in article 48(1) are “without unreasonable delay,
130
unreasonable inconvenience, and uncertainty of reimbursement.” When
the seller and buyer interact, the two sets of conditions are jointly imposed
on their cooperation. (The buyer’s condition, i.e., the absence of
unreasonableness, has catch-all characteristics which can embrace the three
conditions imposed on the seller’s offer to remedy.)
Professor Honnold cogently illustrates the steps which sensible
merchants would take to cure a defect of goods:
Let us suppose that . . . on June 1, shortly after arrival of the goods,
Buyer emailed: “Machine does not operate[,] apparently because of
a defect in Part X. Will you remedy the defect? Must have machine
in working order by June 20 or will be forced to avoid contract and
obtain machine elsewhere. Need to know by June 10 what you plan
to do with respect to arrival of your engineer and plans for repair.”
Such a message would respond to the parties’ normal commercial
interests to maintain a productive business relationship. . . . This
advanced stage of the relationship between the parties, with the
buyer in possession of defective goods shipped by the seller, leads
to the conclusion that the seller also has the “obligation” to respond
to the buyer’s request for early information regarding the seller’s
plans concerning cure. . . . When cure of a defect is feasible[,] the
seller will be anxious to effect the cure to preserve good business
relationships and also to minimize the loss resulting from
avoidance of the contract. The point . . . is to suggest that the buyer
need not be consumed by doubt over whether the seller will cure
131
the defect; a simple inquiry will provide the answer.

130.
For detailed explication about these conditions, see generally Peter Huber, Article
48, in UN COMMENTARY supra note 16, at 698.
131.
HONNOLD, supra note 28, at 427–28, art. 48, § 296; see also Markus Müller-Chen,
Article 48, in SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 12, at 769, ¶ 16 (“[I]t must be
pointed out that the dogmatic difficulties in the relationship between the seller’s right to
remedy by subsequent performance and the buyer’s right to avoid the contract occur primarily
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In answering the buyer’s inquiry, the seller may sometimes provide a
132
reasonable assurance to the buyer that cure is feasible and may make a
price-reduction agreement. Thus, the feasibility of cure is the watershed
which divides a non-fundamental breach and a fundamental one. If cure is
feasible and a collaborative, good faith attempt to remedy has succeeded,
there exists no fundamental breach. If the seller refuses to cure for no valid
reason or is indolent in attempting to cure, the defect amounts to a
fundamental breach, and the buyer can declare the contract avoided.
Likewise, if a cure is not feasible or sincere attempts to cure have turned out
to be fruitless, then the breach is qualified as fundamental, substantially
depriving the buyer of his legitimate expectations. If the buyer refuses
seller’s sincere offer to cure when cure is feasible, the breach is not
qualified as fundamental, and if the buyer declared the contract avoided, he
himself may be liable for a fundamental breach. Although these results
might be unforeseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract (preventing
the contract from being avoided according to the foreseeability test), nonavoidance in this situation adds insult to injury: At the time the contract is
concluded, reasonable merchants will have a tacit assumption that some of
the goods they deal in will need to be repaired and that attempts to repair
may sometimes fail.
In practice, this aligns with how courts treat failed attempts to cure. The
133
Swiss Packaging Machine Case is illustrative. In that case, involving a
seriously defective packaging machine, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
held:
The packaging machine delivered by [Seller] only achieved 29% of
the agreed performance. Given a loss of productivity of 71%,
[Buyer] is substantially deprived of what it has been entitled to
expect under the contract. This amounts to a fundamental breach.
The numerous attempts by [Seller] to cure the lack of conformity
also demonstrate that the non-conformity could not be remedied
within a reasonable time. Moreover, the particular packaging
machine was specifically designed for [Buyer]’s individual needs.
Therefore, any resale of the machine has been impossible or at least
134
inappropriate for [Buyer].

when the parties do not sufficiently communicate and cooperate with each other.”). Or when a
party acts for an opportunistic reason.
132.
In this article, the word “feasible” is used to mean “practicable, meeting all the
conditions of reasonableness.”
133.
See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court], 18 May 2009, 4A_68/2009,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090518s1.html (last updated May 7,
2010) (Switz.) (Packaging Machine Case).
134.
Id.
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The Italy Plastic Bag Recycling Machine Case is also illustrative.
From the very beginning, a machine for recycling plastic bags failed to
function properly. The fact that the machine never functioned at the optimal
levels it reached during testing was central to the case’s disposition. An
Italian District Court held:
It is indeed indisputably shown that even after the interventions and
repairs conducted by [Seller], the machine was far away from
achieving the promised production capacity. In fact, it has been
proven that the interruptions of the production cycle continued. So
did the replacements, repairs, maintenance, increased power
consumption and low production level, which resulted in economic
136
inefficiency of the production.
137

The U.S. Compressors for Air-Conditioners Case, which is analyzed
in Section A of Part IV, is also illustrative. “[S]everal unsuccessful attempts
to cure the defect in the compressors” were made before the buyer declared
138
the contract avoided.
In all of the above cases, the courts found a
fundamental breach. Probably, it was relatively easy for them to do so, with
the failure of genuine endeavors to repair the machines likely convincing
the judges that the lingering breaches amounted to fundamental ones.
This understanding of fundamentality also aligns with cases where
judges have denied avoidance, inferring that the reasonable efforts of a party
would have cured the defects. The Switzerland Inflatable Triumphal Arch
139
Case is demonstrative. The buyer obtained from the seller three inflatable
triumphal arches, which were set beside a car racing circuit for
advertisement. On the first day of the race, one of them collapsed. The race
management official took down all the arches. Subsequently, the buyer
informed the seller of the defects, and some two weeks later declared the
contract avoided. The court denied a fundamental breach, stating that if a
remedy had been carried out after the first use, the arches could have been
used during later races.
Thus, by applying the principle of good faith, parties, courts, and
scholars are relieved from the futile inquiry of how substantial a substantial
detriment must be in order to pass the muster of article 25, qualifying as a
fundamental breach. Instead, let the parties draw a line in the sand of
substantiality for themselves. They are usually the most acquainted with the

135.
See Trib. di Busto Arsizio, 13 Dicembre 2001, n.1192, translation available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011213i3.html (last updated November 26, 2012) (It.)
(Machinery Case).
136.
Id.
137.
71 F.3d 1024, supra note 46.
138.
Id. at 1027.
139.
Handelsgericht Aargau [HG] [Commercial Court], Nov. 5, 2002, OR.2001.00029,
translation available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021105s1.html (last updated Dec. 9,
2009) (Switz.) (Inflatable Triumphal Arch Case).
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peculiar characteristics of their own problems. It is better to make them
formulate a remedy of their own, one best suited to their unique situation.
But in cases where remedial measures have not been taken when they seem
to have been possible, it is for a judge to decide the feasibility of remedy,
with the help of the parties and experts.

VIII. Conclusion
Presently, courts and tribunals have difficulty applying article 25. The
actual situation is aptly described:
Several factual and abstract circumstances must be considered
before the interpreter can say that a fundamental breach did occur.
As a result, it may become difficult to respond to the basic question
[of] whether a contract is avoidable or not in a particular situation,
without submitting the case to a court of law or to an arbitral
140
tribunal.
Fortunately, in our long quest for a sensible interpretation of article 25,
we have found a solution: determining the existence of a fundamental
breach based on the success of the parties’ (now mandatory) good faith
efforts to remedy the non-compliance of goods. The verdict they reach after
deliberations and trials will work as a sorting mechanism to distinguish
fundamental breaches from non-fundamental ones. This test saves us an
otiose quest for a definition of “fundamental” using “substantial”—which,
141
as we have discussed, is at best a “playful tautology.”
Still, the final answer will be made by a court. This is implied in the
letters of article 49(1), providing, “The buyer may declare the contract
142
avoided.” This tells the buyer, “You may declare if you wish, but a court
may hold otherwise if the seller could have remedied the non-compliance.”
Thus, the CISG leaves the initial judgement of fundamentality of breach to
143
the declaring party, to be checked by both counterparty and court. This
article has advocated that the initial (subjective) judgement of
fundamentality of breach should be scrutinized by the collaborative, bona
fide efforts of both parties to cure the defects. If the defects have been
cured, there is no fundamental breach, and if they have not be cured, there
remains a fundamental breach and the buyer can avoid the contract.

140.
Grebler, supra note 56, at 409.
141.
Michael Will, Article 25, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 211.
142.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 49(1) (emphasis added).
143.
See U.N. Secretariat, Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, at 41, art. 45 (now art. 49), commentary ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/19 (1980) (“Under article [49] of this Convention the contract is still in force unless
the buyer has affirmatively declared it avoided. Of course, uncertainty may still exist as to
whether the conditions had been met authorizing the buyer to declare the contract avoided.”).
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This author sincerely hopes this article will save parties from going to
court, which may compel far more time, cost, and inconvenience than
making another transaction for sound goods with another seller from
scratch. Hopefully, this article will also save time for judges who might
agonize in searching for a universal criterion of substantial detriment in
vain. While scholars have time to muse, judges and lawyers usually do not,
144
and merchants even less.

144.
See Michael Will, Article 25, in VIENNA COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 208 (“But
while philosophers have time to muse, lawyers usually have not; and merchants even less.”).

